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Law and Order
The spread of crime and violence in
the United States, often in the name of
civil rights, has caused concern to lawyers
Writing in the
and sensible citizens.
October, 1965 issue of the New York
State Bar Journal, retired Supreme Court
Justice Charles E. Whittaker makes some
pertinent observations on the subject
which merit every reader's attention.
According to Mr. Justice Whittaker it
seems rather clear that a large part of
the current rash and rapid spread of
lawlessness in our land has been, at the
least, fostered and inflamed by the preachments of self-appointed leaders of minority groups to "obey the good laws, but
to violate the bad ones"-which, of
course, simply advocates violation of the
laws they do not like, or, in other words,
the taking of the law into their own
hands.
And this is precisely what their
followers have done and are doing-all
under the banner of "peaceable civil
disobedience," which they have claimed
to be protected by the peaceableassembly-and-petition provision of the
First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Although such preachments and practices have become far more vocal and
widespread in our recent racial strife,

they did not have their origin in that
strife, but, rather, in the labor strife,
sit-ins and lie-downs of an earlier era.
More recently, certain self-appointed
racial leaders, doubtless recalling the
appeasements and, hence, successes of that
earlier conduct, have simply adopted and
used those techniques in fomenting and
waging their lawless campaigns which
they have called "demonstrations."
They have recently used these techniques to incite their followers to assemble, from far and wide-often, unfortunately, with the encouragement and at
the expense of well-meaning but misguided church organizations-into large
and loosely assembled groups, which
many have regarded as mobs, to wage
what they have called "demonstrations"
to force the grant of "rights" in defiance
of the law, the courts and all constituted
authority.
At the beginning, those "demonstrations" consisted of episodic group invasions and appropriation of private
stores, first by sitting down and later by
lying down therein, and, eventually, by
blocking the entrances thereto with their
bodies.
Seeing that those trespasses were often
applauded in high places, were generally
not punished, but, rather, were compelled to be appeased, and rewarded, -those

IN

OTHER

PUBLICATIONS

racial leaders and their groups quickly
enlarged the scope of their activities by
massing and marching their followers on
the sidewalks, streets and highwaysfrequently blocking and appropriating
them to a degree that precluded their
intended public uses.
And that conduct, too, being nearly
always appeased, the process spread areawise, as might have been expected, from
one Southern city to another, and then
into many Northern cities, including St.
Louis, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia,
Washington, New York, Syracuse and
Rochester, and, eventually, pretty generally throughout the land.
"Crime," says Webster, means "an act
or omission forbidden by law and punishIt cannot be
able upon conviction."
denied that each of those trespasses
violated, at least, the criminal-trespass
laws of the local jurisdiction involved, nor
that those laws impose penalties for their
violation, nor, hence, that those trespasses constituted crimes.
In the first place, that conduct cannot
properly be termed "peaceable," for we
all know from experience that the assembly of large groups for the avowed purpose of forcing direct action outside the
law amounts to the creation of a mob
bent on lawlessness, and inherently disturbs the peace of all others.
One could hardly deny the truth of the
statement written by Mr. Justice Black,
joined by two other Justices, in June,
1964, that "force leads to violence,
violence to mob conflicts, and these to
rule by the strongest groups with control
of the most deadly weapons."
Nor can this conduct even be termed

"civil disobedience," for conduct violating
criminal laws is not "civil" but "criminal"
disobedience. And, lastly, that conduct
is not protected by the peaceable-assemblyand-petition provision of the first amendment. That provision says: "Congress shall
make no law. . . abridging. . . the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and
to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." Nothing in that language
grants a license to any man, acting either
singly or in a group, to violate state
criminal laws-including those laws which
prohibit trespass upon and appropriation
of private property, and those laws
prohibiting the willful obstruction of the
public walks, streets and highways.
Rather, as Mr. Justice Roberts wrote
upon the subject in 1939:
The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions must be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but is relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order
Mr. Justice Whittaker points out that
surely no thoughtful person will disagree
with this statement, nor with the statement made very recently by the president
of Yale University in a speech at Detroit,
that the current rash of "demonstrations"
make "a ludicrous mockery of the democratic debating process."
The philosophy of "obeying only the
laws you like," and of openly defying and
breaking 'the ones you do not like, has
given rise to mobs and mob actions that
have proven-as certainly we should have
expected-to be tailor-made for infiltration, take-over and use by rabble-rousers
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and Communists who are avowedly bent
on the breakdown of law, order and
morality in our society and, hence, in its
destruction.
And even though those results may not
have been contemplated, and surely were
not wished by those Americans who so
advocated disobedience of our laws,
nevertheless, they did advocate that
philosophy and they did put its process
into action, and cannot now escape responsibility for its results.
Whatever may have been the provocations-and, doubtless, there have been
some-no man, or any group or race of
men, can be permitted, in a government
of laws, to take the law, or what they
think ought to be the law, into their own
hands, for that is anarchy, and sure to
result in chaos. The fact that the provocations may have been themselves constitutionally unlawful cannot justify unlawful
means for their resolution. Both types
of conduct are wrong--constitutionally
wrong, the one as much as the other. And,
obviously, two wrongs cannot make a
right.
All discriminations that violate the
Constitution and laws of the United States
are readily redressable in our courts, which
have always been open to all citizens.
And no one has any room to doubt that,
if he will resort to those courts, and have
the patience to await their processes-as
we must do in an ordered society-all
his constitutional and legal rights will be
vouchsafed to him, whatever his creed
or color.
But there has been impatience with the
judicial processes, manifested by the recent hue and cry for "action now-not
the delays of the law." Certainly, this

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER

1966

clich6, too, advocates such direct action as
amounts to a clear call for disobedience

of the laws, the judgments of the courts
and of all constituted authority and lawful
processes.
It is true that legal processes, being
refined and deliberative processes, are
slow. But like the mills of the gods,
though they grind slowly, they grind
exceedingly fine, and their judgments
are most likely to be just. In all events,
there is no other fair and orderly way to
decide the issues that arise among us, and
to have an ordered liberty.
Every ordered society in history has
found it necessary to establish laws, and
courts fairly to interpret and enforce them;
and the same history makes clear, too,
that the first evidences of a society's decay may be seen in its toleration of
disrespect for, and disobedience of, its
laws and the judgments of its courts.
The great pity here is that these minority groups, in preaching and practicing
defiance of the law, are in fact, advocating erosion and destruction of the only
structure that can ever assure to them, or
permanently maintain for them, due
process of law and the equal protection
of the laws, and that can, thus, protect
them from discriminations and abuses by
majorities.
Mr. Justice Whittaker ends by stating
that the causes are plain. We have, in
high places, tolerated and even encouraged
preachments to break the law-such as:
"Obey the good laws but break the bad
ones," which, of course, means to obey
only the laws you like; and such as:
"Action now, not the delays of the law,"
which is, of course, a call for direct action
outside the law and the courts.
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And we have also tolerated and in
some high places have even encouraged,
the actual defiances of the law which
those preachments have advocated and
brought into existence, and which have
now spread to all areas of the nation, and
seriously threaten the breakdown of law,
order and morality.
The remedy is equally plain. It is
simply to insist that our governments,
state and federal, reassume and discharge
their first duty of protecting the people
against lawless invasions of their persons
and property and from assaults upon their
liberties by demanding and commanding
respect for law and legal processes
through the impartial, evenhanded, vigorous, swift and certain enforcement of our
criminal laws and the real and substantial
punishment thereunder of all conduct that
violates those laws.
These are not platitudes, but are fundamentals and vital, as every thinking man
should see, to the survival of our nation.
In no other way can we orderly resolve
the issues that confront and divide us,
or live together in peace and harmony as
a civilized nation of brothers under the
fatherhood of God.
Obscenity
The May 1965 edition of the Operation
Yorkville Newsletter contains a thoughtprovoking challenge to lawyers interested
in the problems of drafting obscenity
legislation. The author, Edward F. Cavanagh, Jr., (formerly Deputy Mayor of the
City of New York), reasons that to meet
the growing demand by the courts for
clarification, explanation and "definition,"
there is need for exploration into the
concept of "obscenity."

It is obvious that there can never be
any clearly drawn, concise "definition" of
obscenity. However, such a "definition"
is unnecessary, for an obscene action, and
thus the depiction of that action, can be
clearly, distinctly described. Therefore, a
description of obscenity, its degrees and
categories should be adequate to support
valid legislation.
Obscenity is an abstraction. The abstract can be fully understood only when
its concrete characteristics are fully understood. Thus, one cannot understand the
concept of poetry-an abstraction-as
such, until he becomes thoroughly familiar
with types of poetry: epic, lyric, dramatic
concrete. So, too, "obscenity" can
-the
be described only after one fully understands types of obscenity-or that which
is "obscene." The word "obscene," therefore, must be fully grasped in its total
concrete complexity before the abstract
"obscenity" can be clearly grasped.
To understand the meaning of the word
"obscene," synonyms and antonyms, even
though not formal definitions, can be an
aid. Synonyms (words of the same or
almost the same meaning) found under
the word obscene in any dictionary are
"lewd."
"foul," "disgusting,"
"dirty,"
Antonyms (words that negate others by
total implications) are "clean," "pure,"
"uplifting," "chaste." Both synonyms and
antonyms are valuable in explaining the
word "obscene" in that they are concrete.
We think, for example, of a "dirty shirt,"
a "foul sewer," etc., just as we think of
a "clean glass," a "pure chemical," a
"chaste woman," etc. Besides being concrete, its synonyms and antonyms present
clearly the meaning of the word "obscene."
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The problem in describing the abstraction "obscenity" is not in finding
synonyms or antonyms, nor in describing
the obscene word, gesture, book or picture, but rather in describing the obscene
action. The obscene word, gesture, picture are such purely because of their relation to the action. Basic, therefore, is a
description of the obscene action or,
synonymously, the "dirty, foul, disgusting,
lewd action." These obscene actions may
be separated into three areas of somewhat
rising intensity. This division, however,
does not suggest there be a gradation of
guilt and punishment in the distribution
of that which is obscene to youth.
Normal-Sexual Obscene Action. Actions are obscene or not obscene depending upon whether they are engaged in
public or in private. Normal sexual action,
or its preludes, when engaged in publicly
constitute obscene action. Normal sexual
action when engaged in by married partners in private, is clean, pure, uplifting,
chaste. When performed in public, the
same action is dirty, low, disgusting, lewd.
Deviated-Sexual Obscene Action. Abnormal or deviated sexual actions, or their
preludes, when performed in public constitute obscene actions. This includes
manifestations of homosexuality or exhibitionism. Deviated sex actions are more
shocking when engaged in publicly, and
hence more obscene.
Perverted-Sexual Obscene Action. Actions involving sexual violence, when performed in public, constitute obscene action. These actions (sadism, masochism,
etc.) represent the depths of obscenity;
are most clearly dirty, foul, disgusting,
lewd, particularly to onlookers.
All these actions when performed in
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public make the performers subject to
arrest.
In order then, to understand obscenity,
the abstraction, one must think in terms of
the mass media which picture obscene
action by word, picture, record or tape for
circulation in a highly pressurized operation geared to the teen-age market. Obscenity, therefore, is simply the imaginative projection in word, picture, magazine,
book, record or tape of that action which
is obscene. Corresponding to the three
categories of obscene action are three
categories of obscenity:
Normal-Sexual Obscenity. Imaginative
projection in word, sound or picture of
normal sexual activity for no other purpose than to stimulate the subconscious
into imitation.
Deviated-Sexual Obscenity. Imaginative
projection in word, sound or picture of
abnormal, deviated sexual action for no
other purpose than to stimulate the subconscious into imitation.
Perverted-Sexual Obscenity. Imaginative projection in word, sound or picture
of sexual violence for no other purpose
than to stimulate the subconscious into
imitation.
If public homosexual action, for example, is obscene, the imaginative projection of this action is even more obscene, because more public. For, in mass
media, the homosexual activity is thrust
upon millions, including innocent children,
prime targets of the homosexual.
No further scientific "definition" of obscenity is necessary, because, for legal
control and law enforcement, one need
only describe the obscene action and that
which pictures it-such as the homosexual
magazine. No scientific "definition" of
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obscenity is indeed possible since the
three concepts contained in that which is
obscene are so complex and diverse that
they cannot be incorporated into a simple
definition (that which is clearer than the
thing defined and fits only the thing defined).
It is the task of the lawmaker, therefore, to describe in words that action
which is obscene, so that law enforcement
agencies and the judiciary can give
American children adequate protection
from the imaginative projection of that
action, and eventual imitation.
Law and Morals
The April 1966 issue of Catholic Mind
features an article by Francis Canavan,
S.J. on the intriguing problem of law and
morals in a pluralistic society. Father
Canavan poses the question to what extent, and in what way, should the state
attempt, through its laws, to enforce moral
standards upon the entire population. This
question is posed, not in a society that
is united in its fundamental religious and
moral convictions, but in a mixed and
divided society. This pluralistic society
is, moreover, one that is undergoing rapid
change-not always for the better-in
many ways. Today more than ever, therefore, it is impossible to regard law as a
mere extension of morals, or to maintain
that all that is immoral can and ought to
be made illegal.
A Catholic attitude toward law and
morals must be a carefully balanced and
nuanced one. Without attempting to outline the proper stance for Catholics to
take on all legal-moral questions in every
country, Father Canavan sets down some
guidelines for Catholic participation in
the framing of laws.

Even in a pluralistic society there is a
public morality. Divided though it be,
the community is a community in virtue
of what its members have in common.
Among the things they hold in common
are certain moral values and principles.
The commonwealth depends in large part
precisely upon these common moral convictions. Without them, the community
would degenerate to the level of imprisoned criminals who are held together only
by the walls that surround them.
There is, therefore, a public morality
that law can and does enforce. But from
this point forward certain distinctions must
be made. They are well grounded in the
tradition of Catholic moral theology and
are nothing new. Nonetheless, according
to Father Canavan, they need repetition.
First, then, the law commands and forbids for the sake of men's temporal, not
their eternal, welfare. Directly, at least,
the law intends to promote the welfare
of society, not the salvation of souls. It
therefore punishes crimes against society,
not sins against God.
Furthermore, the law issues its commands and prohibitions for the sake of
the community's welfare, not for the
purely private good of individuals. It
may, of course, aid individuals directly, as
it does through the variety of social welfare programs that are characteristic of
the modern state. But it does even this
for the general good of society rather than
for the private welfare of individuals.
Where the state legislates on moral
matters, its intention is (or ought to be) to
promote public morality and not to intrude into the individual's private and
personal life.
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Human activity does not legitimately
become the law's business until it begins
to affect other persons and thus to impinge upon a public concern. Not only
that; even though an action is harmful in
some way to the community, it should
not be made a subject of legislation unless
it is or threatens to become substantially
harmful. Not every minor social evil
justifies legal regulation or prohibition.
As Edmund Burke said, it is no small
part of civil wisdom to know how much
of an evil ought to be tolerated. The
law may, because it must, tolerate some
evils in the realm of moral conduct. If
prohibition of a vice is likely to work
greater harm to the community than
toleration, or if a prohibition is such
that it cannot be enforced, or if it brings
the law into disrepute, then lawmakers
will prudently refrain from imposing it
by statute.
For law is essentially practical. Its
purpose is to enhance the welfare of the
community by promoting those human
values for which society exists; and this
is surely a moral purpose. But law can
realize this purpose only by achieving
practical results that in fact foster those
values in the existing conditions of the
community for which it is made. We
cannot judge the desirability of a law
merely by asking whether it enforces a
sound moral principle.
Lawmakers must estimate as realistically as they can all of the consequences
that a law will have in practice. Flat
prohibition of a vice may effectively suppress it in one community. But in another
situation it may lead to other and greater
evils, such as corruption of the police and
of party politicians. The party politics
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of more than one American city are
financed by large contributions from professional gamblers-whose activities are
banned by laws that are intended to save
the citizens from the temptation to gamble.
It is therefore permissible-at times
even advisable-for the law to regulate
and control what it cannot effectively
abolish. The British seek to keep the.
spread of narcotic drug addiction within
bounds by taking the profit out of the
drug traffic. They furnish drugs free to
licensed addicts. Their method of dealing with this problem may not be the
ideal one. But it appears in a favorable
light when contrasted with the results of
American attempts to suppress the traffic
in narcotics by prohibiting it altogether.
Sometimes law achieves better results
when it works by indirection than by a
frontal assault on an evil.
Nevertheless, law does have a legitimate function in protecting and promoting
public morals. In performing this function,
it reflects the community's moral conscience. For this reason, laws that impose moral standards on personal conduct ought to enjoy the support of a
consensus.
A bare majority suffices to enact a tax
law or to pass a measure for constructing
highways. Such decisions, once made,
are usually accepted by the defeated minority with more or less good grace. But
a law that seeks to establish a moral
standard of conduct cannot be enforced
if it is not supported by the moral beliefs
of the larger and sounder part of the community. This is what is meant here by
the consensus by which laws for the protection of public morals must be supported. It is not unanimity. But it is a
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measure of agreement great enough that
one can say, in a meaningful sense, that
the laws represent the conscience of the
community and do not merely impose the
moral judgment of one part of it on the
rest.
Moral-legal questions become acute,
however, precisely when the consensus
either does not exist or is called into question by a sizeable minority that is intent
on changing the law. Here it becomes
necessary to distinguish two "moments"
in a changing society.
The first moment is one in which a
new and higher moral standard is being
advocated, with a view to embodying it in
law. For those who accept Catholic
morality as valid, such a situation is a
rare one in modern societies. The tide
is not flowing in favor of traditional
Christian morality; the sound we hear
today is the melancholy, long, withdrawing roar of the sea of faith. But if the
tide turns-as tides do-then it will become relevant to make a suggestion:
Catholics should be hesitant to enact laws
that impose higher than the generally accepted standards of public morality. This
is not to say that the law may never be
made more strict. But it would be both
wise and just first to convert society to
our moral beliefs, and to achieve an adequate degree of popular consent, before
translating improved moral standards
into legal norms.
The more relevant question today, however, is how we should act in the other
moment. That is, in a situation in which
a moral consensus that once existed, and
which supported laws that are still on the
statute books, is breaking down. This is
the prevailing situation in most parts of

what once was Christendom.
The demand that is being pressed in the public
forum on most countries is not for laws
that more closely conform to the Christian
conscience. Quite the opposite; the cry is
for easier divorce, easier abortion and the
active promotion of contraception as a
governmental policy.
In these circumstances, it is certainly
not obligatory to capitulate at once to
every demand for more "liberal" laws.
Initially, at least, the presumption favors
retention of the existing law and the burden of proof falls on those who advocate
change, not on those who oppose it. Law,
after all, has an important educational
function: it proclaims a public moral
standard and this is weakened when laws
are changed in the direction of greater
laxity. This is not a conclusive argument
against any and all change in the law,
but it indicates that a certain conservatism
in regard to the law is also a part of civil
wisdom.
The change of law on a subject of public morality is all too often taken by a
part of the population as a modification
of morality itself. The experience of
some Scandinavian and Eastern European
countries, for example, suggests that a
"liberal" and "rational" legal attitude towards abortion, convinces many people
that they have a right to abortion. When
even the liberalized law denies them a
legal abortion, they resort to illegal abortion. The result is an increase in the
number, not only of legal abortions, but
of illegal ones as well.
One might fear with equally good
reason that a completely rationalistic and
utilitarian approach to divorce would only
lead to more divorces rather than to
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divorces granted on more realistic and
rational grounds. Catholics could in conscience consent to a reformation of the
divorce laws in many countries, even to
a fairly drastic restructuring of these
laws, if there were solid grounds for expecting that the general effect would be
to promote the stability of marriage and
to grant divorces only in the more extreme cases. But mere "liberalization" is
hardly likely to produce such happy results.
There are sound reasons, therefore, for
resisting the lowering of legal moral
standards. Nonetheless, the law must
in the long run reflect the beliefs of the
people, because it ultimately depends on
their consent. When the moral consensus
that has supported a law in the past breaks
down to a sufficient degree, the law must
change or become a dead letter.
Since the law sooner or later must reflect public opinion, the mission of
Catholics in debates about public morality
is not adequately defined as one of advocating or defending laws that embody
sound moral principles. In the long run,
it is far more important to influence the
public conscience from which laws spring.
Let us not deceive ourselves: this is
not an easy thing to do. In a religiously
divided and partly de-Christianized society, we cannot appeal to the authority
of the Church or of God Himself. This
is not to say that we should disguise the
religious source of our moral convictions
or pretend that we believe in the viability
of a purely secular morality. But to
achieve a consensus in the public forum,
we must speak of fundamental human
values that all can recognize and accept.
Even this is not easy to do in terms
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that will carry conviction to most people
today. Modem man tends to be, not
only a sceptic in religion, but an empiricist
in philosophy and therefore a relativist
in morals. The public moral philosophy
of the West is turning into a secular
utilitarianism that has little room for such
ideas as the indissolubility of marriage, the
sanctity of embryonic life or the integrity
of the marital act.
It is to men infected with this mentality
that we must address ourselves. There
is little use in asking them to impose on
themselves laws that enact all of the
absolute prohibitions and commands of
Catholic morality. Nor would it be wise
to seek this even if it could be obtained:
God requires far more of us than human
law can dare demand.
But we can hope, and certainly should
try, to restore to the men of today an
insight that they are losing: the Catholic
vision that life is good and is a great gift
from God. Because life is good, marriage is good, procreation is good and
the life that is procreated is good.
All that attacks or corrupts life and all
that weakens the institutions that shelter
and foster life is evil. Only when modern
men regain this vision can we stem the
tide of opinion that is now undermining
Christian morality and is therefore sweeping away the legal structures inspired by
that morality.
Church-State
The June 1966 issue of the Notre
Dame Lawyer contains a survey of
Church-State material which has been
awaited with much anticipation by readers
familiar with past coverage of this subject in that publicaton.
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In this Survey, the Notre Dame Lawyer
presents an analysis of the Church-State
relationship in America. This is the fifth
such analysis in a biennial series begun
in 1958. The purpose of the study is
twofold. It first seeks to report completely the relevant judicial decisions and
legislative enactments which have occurred
during the previous two years; it then
analyzes this activity in an attempt to
determine both the recent developments
the Church-State relationship has undergone and the trends presaged by this
activity.
The first four studies in this series bear
witness to the changing emphasis given to
the many facets of this relationship. While
the area is crossed by mighty rivers of
decision which have long flowed within
well-defined banks, it continually experiences a flow of new problems from
previously uncharted springs. Sometimes
the flow quickly dries. At other times
it becomes a raging torrent cutting new
channels in the law.
The volatile nature of the ChurchState relationship continues to be reflected
in the present Survey. The first section,
Religious Institutions, treats of the direct
conflicts which arise between Church and
State, considered as juridical entities,
when each seeks to "justify its rights'
against the asserted authority of the
other."
Within this problem area, the
law applicable to matters involving
Church Property continues to be static.
On the other hand, the area of Education
continues to develop significantly with
the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Further
consideration is also given to the School
Prayer Cases.

In the second section, Free Exercise,
an examination is made of the deference
accorded to religiously motivated actions
under the guise of free exercise. The
effect of the recent cases in this area
is ambivalent. The long-awaited Supreme
Court interpretation of the "belief in a
Supreme Being" requirement applied to
conscientious objectors was handed down
in United States v. Seeger. The courts
also furthered a spirit of accommodation
by showing an increasing sensitivity for
the religious rights of imprisoned Black
Muslims.
Finally, in Schowgurow v.
State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional a provision of the state
constitution requiring jurors to affirm a
belief in God. In contrast, a lack of
sympathy for certain minority beliefs was
evident in the Supreme Court's refusal to
re-evaluate Sunday closing law precedent,
and in the actions of several tribunals in
ordering the transfusion of blood to adult
Jehovah's Witnesses.
The third section, Religious Values,
deals with the broader problem of religious values seeking recognition before
the legal tribunals of our country. Consideration is given both to instances of
religion attaining the status of a legal
value and to examples of the law invading the moral order. The section's peculiar concern is with the law's appraisal of
religion and "religious" aims. Particular
emphasis has been given to the field of
Obscenity, as major evolutions have occurred culminating with the recent Supreme Court pronouncements in the Ginzburg, Fanny Hill, and Mishkin cases. The
areas of Birth Control and Anti-Miscegenation have also seen developments,
primarily in the Griswold and McLaughlin
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decisions.
The determination of the proper relationship between Church and State is
an important one, affecting as it does
men's allegiance to two Sovereigns. From
the birth of America to the present, its
citizens have recognized this importance
and, with an ardor that is found only
where men's deepest ideological beliefs
are in issue, have long sought the resolution of this question. And yet, agreement on what is the proper relationship
has not been achieved. In the words of
Justice Black,
Our insistence on 'a wall between Church
and State which must be kept high and
impregnable' has seemed to some a correct exposition of the philosophy and a
true interpretation of the language of the
First Amendment to which we should
strictly adhere. With equal conviction and
sincerity, others have thought the . . . decision fundamentally wrong and have
pledged continuous warfare against it.
The American concept of Church and
State, then, continues to develop. This
Survey charts that development.
Natural Law
A recent article appearing in the
February 1966 issue of Stanford Law
Review takes issue, in part, with some of
the conclusions reached in the study of
the natural law philosophy of Lon Fuller,
authored by Charles L. Palms, C.S.P. and
published in the Spring 1965 issue of
The Catholic Lawyer.
The writer, Professor Douglas Sturm
of Bucknell University, criticizes Father
Palms for implying that the substantive
side of Fuller's natural law doctrine is
deficient because of its lack of attention
to fundamental metaphysical and ethical
principles. According to Professor Sturm,
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this very proposal indicates a serious misunderstanding of Fuller's philosophical
position. Moreover it seems to be based
upon a failure to differentiate the full
variety of dimensions of natural law
actually found in Fuller's writings.
In sum, according to Professor Sturm,
the most fundamental aspect of substantive natural law in Fuller's legal and
moral philosophy is, in effect, the following postulate: each man is, by virtue of
the fact that he is a man, a living, purposing, communicating being and ought
to be treated as such, so that so far as
possible, without regard to differentiating
characteristics, human life is preserved,
purposiveness is kept alive, and communication is maintained.
Fuller's view of man is stated more in
terms of process than in terms of substance; it is more voluntaristic than rationalistic; it is more Dionysian than
Apollonian. In other words, the "supreme
end" or "ultimate destiny" of man, were
Fuller to use those terms, is conceived
not as a stage of human development to
be achieved at some moment once and
for all; not as a state that can be realized
and that, once realized, results in the
cessation of desire and movement; not
as a condition of static perfection. Rather
the "supreme end" or "ultimate destiny"
of man is a quality of living, a mode of
developing, a character of action that
must be rechosen and reactualized again
and again in each new moment of living,
in each new stage of development, in each
new instant of action. It is this understanding of man that leads Fuller to pay
close attention to the procedural aspects
(Continued on page 267)

